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IS A GRANT A CONTRACT.
A Review of Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87.
On January 7, 1795, an Act of the Georgia Legislature became a law by the approval of its governor,
which directed a sale of virtually all the land then embraced within the limits of the state, lying between the
present western boundary of the state and the river
Misissippi. The purobasers were four conpanies. The
The
area of the land sold exceeded 35,000,000 acres.
price paid was $500,000 in specie or approved currency.1
The governor's deed, in pursuance of the act, was dated
January 13, 1795.
A portion of this land was conveyed by the purchasers, August 22, 1795, to James Greenleaf, who, on
September 23, 1795, conveyed a part to Prince, who
conveyed to Phelps February 27, 1796, who conveyed to
John Peck December 8, 1800. Peck on May 14, 1803,
conveyed to Robert Fletcher.
Peck's deed to Fletcher contained several covenants, viz: That Georgma at the time of its conveyance,
was "seised in fee" of the soil, subject to the extin'Says Albert J Beveridge, Vol III, Life of Marshall, p. 551,
"The greatest real estate deal in history was thus consummat-

ed."
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guislrment of the title of Indians who occupied a portion of the land; that the legislature had good right to
make the sale; that the governor who executed the
deed, had lawful authority to iake it; that all the
title of Georgia had been conveyed to John Peck,
Fletcher's grantor; and that the title had been dn no
way constitutionally or legally inrjpaired by virtue of
any act of the legislature of Georgia passed subsequently to the 1conveyance of January 13, 1795.
On February 13, 1796, the legislature of Georgia
repealed the act which had authorized the sale, declaring it a "usurped act" and to be "null and void;" and
asserting that the land which the conveyance of January 13, 1795, purported to convey, was "the sole property of the state subject only to the right oT the United States (with the occupying Indian tribes) to enable
the state to purchase, under its pre-emption right, the
Indian title to -the same." The reason for this attenpt
to annul the -grant was, as Senator Beveridge puts it,2
that "It came out that every member of the legislature
who had voted for the measure, except .one, had shares
of stock in the purchasing companies."
The action Fletcher vs. Peck was brought upon
the above covenants. It was brought, not in a court of
the State of Georgia, but in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Massachusetts.
Whether the conveyance from Peck to Fletcher was a
bona fide, conveyance, or only a fictitious one, agreed
on ifor the purpose of obtaining the judgment of the
Federal courts, is not wholly clear. Beveridge describes
it as a "friendly" suit. Referring to the alleged sale by
Peck to Fletcher, he says: "On May 14, 1803, he had
sold or pretended to sell, to one Robert Fletcher, of
Amherst, New Hampshire, 15,000 acres of his holdings
2Life of Marshall, Vol III p. 561.
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for the sum of $3,000." In an opinion concurring with
the result announced by the court, Johnson, J., confessed that he had been "very unwilling to proceed to the
decision of the cause at all. It appears to me to bear
strong evidence, upon the face of it, of being a anere
feigned case. It is our duty to decide on the rights, but
not on the speculations of parties." He justified his entertainment of the case by his "confidence" in the respectable gentlemen who have been engaged for the
,parties; which had induced him, to "abandon my (his)
scruples on the belief that they would never consent to
impose a mere feigned case upon the court."'
The first question raised by the covenants is, Was
Georgia seised in fee of the land in 1795? The plaintiff
alleged that not Georgia but the United States, had the
fee. On this issue a special verdict of the jury was
taken; finding a grant of Charles II to the Earl of
Clarendon and others, and other facts, from which apparently, the court, not the jury, finds that Georgia was
seised. One of these facts is a proclamation in 1763, by
George III, the king of Great Brdtair, in which he declared that all the land between the Alatamaha and St.
Mary's should be annexed to Georgia, but reserving
under the donminion of the Crown for the use of the
Indians all the lands on the western waters, and forbidding a settlement on them, or a purchase of them, from
the Indians. The lands conveyed to the tplaintiff lie
on these "western waters."
Marshall, C. J., thinks this reservation a temnporary arrangement, suspending for a time the settlement of the country, but it "is not conceived to amount
to an alteration of the boundaries of the colony." He
thinks that the commissions given by the king to the
aLife of Marshall, Vol. III, p. 584.
'96 Cranch p. 147.
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governor of Georgia "entirely remove the doubt," if
the terms -of the proclamation led to any. The land in
question is, the court thinks, "within the state of
Georgia."
Nor do the majority of the court think that the
nature of the Indian title is "absolutely repugnant to
seisin in fee on the part of the state :" The covenant that
the state was seised in fee dn 1795 was, therefore,
not broken. Speaking for the miinority, Johnson, J.,
argues that Georgia never had more than a "pre-emptive right" to purchase the lan&t which was not a fee
simple, but simply a power to purchase a fee, when the
Indians should be pleased to sell. If ever mnore than a
"possibility," it was reduced to that state, when
Georgia ceded to the United States, by the ratification
of the constitution, both the power of pre-emption and
of conquest. By such ratifdcation, it retained "only a
resulting right, dependent on a purchase or conquest
to be made by the United States."
But the constitution says nothing of this kind. It
excepts from the representative population of a state,
Indians not taxed and two-fifths of the slaves. Among
the powers of Congress is that to "regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states and
with the Indian tribes." From these clauses, the justice seems to derive a power in the United States to
purchase or conquer the land of the Indians within a
state.
Georgia having the fee the next question is, did
it have the power to convey that fee? No doubt seems
to have been agitated on that point.
The next question is, by What organ could the
state act in alienating its fee? The validity of the sale
depended on the possession by the state's legislature,
of the right to make it. Marshall, C. J., thinks that this
power is "not to be controverted " unless the state con-
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stitution forbade it. The right of the court to bold an
act o(f legislation void which conflicts with the state
constitution, is asserted with an expression of reluctance. Whether it is void for repugancy is "at all times
a question of much delicacy, which ought seldom, if
ever, to be decided in the affirmative, in a doubtful
case." But, in a doubtful case, we have since been repeatedly told, the court should not nullify a statute, and
the Chief Justice adds "the opposition between the
constitution .and the law should be such that the judge
feels 'aclear and strong conviction of their inconpatibility with each other."
The court finds nothing in the constitution of
Georgia inconsistent with the sale of its lands (not of
its jurisdiction over them) by the legislature.
The tacit assumption by the court is, that the
legislature of a state can pass any law, the power to
pass which is not withheld by the constitution.
The next question is, conceding that the legislature has power to sell the state's land, does it pass the
title of the state by its conveyance, if its motives in
making the conveyance are corrupt?
The second count of the -plaintiff's declaration alleges that the original grantees, the four companies,
promised divers members of the legislature that, if they
voted for the bill, and the bill should pass, they should
have a share in the lands purchased from the state;
and that these member. thus influenced, voted' for
the bill.
In dealing with the question whether a corrupt
motive operating in the mind of the legislators, vitiates
their act, Marshall, 0. J., says that the fact that there
is such corruption is "4nost deeply to be deplored."
True! But what is the legal tesult of the corruption?
Ah! That is a question which the courts must approach
'with much circumspection." Yes, truly! But what is
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the result of the circumspection?" We are not told
whether it does or does not affect the validity of the
statute. It may "well be doubted," says the Ohief Justice, whether the validity of the law depends on the
But, if that is so, the court
motives of the framers.
must hold the law valid, for to doubt its invalidity is
no justification for declaring it voi&
Suppose the principle admitted, that if an enact.
ment of the legislature were void, if procured by the
corruption, then it would be necessary to inquire into
the causal force of that corruption. The corruption of
two of a majority of 100, would hardly be reason ,for
condemning as void the enactbmient. To what extent
must the corruption be applied, asks the Ohief Justice.
Must it be direct corruption, or could interest or undue
influence of any kind be sufficient? On what nunber
of members must it operate? Would the public opinion
need to be consultecl, in deciding whether to treat as
null, the legislative act? Brushing aside these queries,
the writer of the opinion sayS, that, even "if the majority of the legislature be corrupted, it may well be
doubted whether it be within the province of the
judiciary to control their conduct," but to doubt, is to
deny the power of the judges. "If less than a majority
act from impure motives, the principle by which judicial interference would be regulated is not clearly
discerned."
But whatever anxiety as to the proper decision of
these questions the court might feel, was dissipated
when it recalled that it is not the state of Georgia which
seeks to annul the sale, nor does it appear by the count
that the state is dissatisfied with the sale.5 "It would
5If the court could take judicial notice, it would have known
that the new legislature was pledged to the voters of the state,
to annul the grant.
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be inde!cent in the extreme, upon a private contract
between two individuals to enter into an inquiry respecting the corruption of the sovereign power of a
state." But, are the members of the legislature for the
time being, the sovereign power of the state? And why
the readiness to annul acts of this sovereign power,
for supposed exlplicit prohibitions of legislation .inthe
constitution, if the implicit prohibitions are to receive
no support? Surely it was not necessary to say in the
constitution that no act shall be passed by the legislature, involving detriment to the state, for the advantage of the individual legislators.
The court bhinks that it is indecent to annul an
act of the legislature, which has conformed to the
"requisite forms of a law" in a suit by A against B.
But we are famMar with such annulments, in private
suits, for violation of prescribed -methods of enactment,
or for excess of power with respect to the substance of
the law, even When the limitations are not explicitely
stated in the constitution.6 If the court could take
judicial notice, it would have known that the new legislature was pledged to the voters of the statei to annul
the grant. Timplied limitations on legislative power are
not unknown, and to say that the legislation must not be
due to the corruption of the legislators would not be
an abrupt departure from recognized principle.
The Chief Justice, in the course of his opinion, observes "It may well be doubted whether the nature of
society and of government does not grescribe some
limits to the legislative power." ITfso, what more rational than to limit the power by the condition that it
shall not be corruptly exercised by,those who are tenants of it for the time being?
The court might have taken judicial notice of the
6Beveridge, Life of IMarshall, p. 562.
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almost unanimous declaration7 of the legislature, at
the following session, or the corruption of dts predecessor, and regarded its act as evidence of the dissatisfaction of the state, since nearly all he members had been
pledged to vote for the repeal.$
Much of what was said on the subject of the effect
of the corruption of the legislators seems to lack pertinency. The third count alleged the corruption. The
plea to the count denied the corruption, but added
that the land sold to Fletcher had passed to the predecessors in title, of Peck without any knowledge of
such corruption, if such there was. The plaintiff's demurrer to this plea was overruled by the trial court,
and properly, says C. J. Marshall
Who could doubt the propriety of overrruling a demurrer to the defendant's denial of the charge of the
plaintiff, that corruption had been used? In sustaining
the action of the Circuit Court on this denurrer, nothing is said about the effects, conceding that there had
been corruption, of the purchase by Peck's predecessors, and by Peck, in ignorance of the fraud.
The third count alleges the fraud of the legislators;
the action of the succeeding legislature in declaring
void the act authorizing the grant, and the grant; and
the resulting voidness of the title conveyed by Peck
to Fletcher. To this count, the plea denies that there
was fraud but alleges that, whether there was or not,
Peck, and his predecessors were innocent purchasers
for value, and not to be affected by -the fraud, so that
a good title had passed to Fletcher. To this Fletcher
demurred. The court sustained the soundness of the
p3lea.
7
Beveridge says, "Nearly every man elected to the new legislature was pledged to vote for the undoing of the fraud in any
manner that might seem the most effective.
$Cooley; Gen. Principles of Constitutional Law, p. 166.
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Two principles guide the court to its conclusion.
These are (a) the principle that when a legal title to
land passes from A to B, although it should be defeasibie for fraud, duress, or accident, operating on the
-grantor, it becomes indefeasible when B conveys for
value to C who has no notice of the infirmative circumstances; and (b) the provision in the constitution of the
United States, forbidding any state's passing a law
which should impair the obligation of a contract.'
(a) When fraud is practiced on the g-tantor a
court of equity may be resorted to by him, as against
the guilty grantee, but not as against the innocent
grantee of this grantee. No bill was filed by the state
of Georgia, to annual the conveyance, but the legislature attempted to annul it, by a later act.
But, the legislature was a party to the transaction,
and its annulment of the grant "must be considered as
a mere act of power." But the decree of a court is an
act of power. What is the force of the word "mere?"
Does it mean improper, unjust, void?
To the suggestion that, since the legislature is the
mere agent of the people, the acts of their unfaithful
agent must cease to be obligatory, the answer deemed
sufficient is, that the people "can act only by these
agents," and hence, if the agents are corrupt others
may be chosen, but the later agents can not annul the
act of the original agents. The Justice intimates that
the later agent, the legislature, should apply to a court
to annul the act of the earlier agent. In annulling itself, it was acting in the character of a court of justice;
it was performing a duty usually assigned to a court,
or it was "exerting a mere act of power." Note again
the attempt to stigmatize the act by calling it a "mere"
act of power.
The justice intends, apparently, to say, that the
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undertaking by one legislature, to set aside the grant
of a preceding legislature is of questionable competence; but, were it unquestionably correct, it should
and must be guided by the principles which the socalled courts of equity have established for their own
guidance, and in particular by the principle that although fraud on the grantor by the grantee will justify
the annubment of the grant as to the latter, it will not
justify it as to one who has innocently purchased the
land granted, from the grantee. '"The rights of third
persons who are purchasers without notice for a valuable consideration, cannot be disregarded." "A court of
chancery: therefore, had a bill been brought to set
aside the conveyance, made by James Gunn and others
(the original grantees) as being obtained by improper
practices with the legislature, whatever nmight have
been its decision as respected the original grantees,
would have been bound by its own rules, and by the
clearest principles of equity, to leave unmolested those
who were purchasers without notice for a valuable consideration."
The principles of equity were judge-made. The
legislature can alter them. It is aibsurd to assert that
any part of the common law or of equity, is superior to
the modifying or repealing power of the legislature,
one of whose principal functions is to correct the
judicial legislation, legal or equitable.
What sanctifies, beyond legislative control, the
doctrine that a title which is in B, but defeasible, for
a fraud practiced on A, the former owner, shall become indefeasible if B succeeds in conveying the land
to C for value, C having no knowledge of the fraud? A
thief can not improve his title by selling the thing
stolen to another however innocent that other may be.
Why should one whose right is destructible, have the
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power to make it indestructible by a conveyance? At
all events, whether he should or not is a matter of
policy, over which the legislature of a state has unquestionable authority. How singular. that a justice of
the Supreme Court should undertake to tmpose limits
on the state legislature, which neither the state constitution, nor the federal constitution, nor the people
of state or United States have prescribed.
A futile refutation of defence of the power of the
Georgia legislature, to pass the repealing and annulling
act is attemrpted. The defence was that one legislature
may repeal any act which a former legislature was
competent to pass. This, concedes the chief justice, is
correct "so far as respects general legislation." But,
he retorts, "if an act be done under a law a succeeding
legislature can not undo it. The past cannot be recalled
by the onst absolute power." How profound! But, if
an act is done under one statute which creates continuous rights in consequence of such act, a future statute
which cuts off the continuance of these rights is not
an abrogation of or an attempt to abrogate the act
done, but simply the consequences for the future. The
Georgia legislature did not .make the act of the preceding legislature not to have been, nor the grant made in
pursuance of it, not to have been. It simply enacted
that for the future no legal consequences of their having been should exist.
Were Georgia a single state, the validity of the
annulling act "might well be doubted" says the justice.
He seems not to have got beyond a doubt, by his reasoning, whether the act was valid or not. Would he, by
such a doubt, have felt himself left under a duty to
enforce it?
(b) But Georgia became a state of the American
Union.
What is the bearing of that act? The Consti-
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tution of the Union declares that no state shall pass
any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.
Georgia's repealing
act of Feb. 13th, 1796, was not a bill of attainder, or
an ex post facto law.
Did it impair the obligation
of a contract?
If effectual, it annulled the grant of the lands; it
reassumed for the state, the ownership with which it
had parted.
The justice conceives that Georgia first
made a contract with the four comnpanies, to make a
grant, and then made the grant.
"The contract between Georgia and the purchasers" he says, "was executed by the grant".
But, if so, the contract, and its
obligations, ceased to exist.
When a man is under an
obligation to pay a sum of money, he puts an end to
the obligation by paying the money.
It is idle to talk
of the subsistence of the contract, or of its obligation,
after full discharge of it by both parties.
The difficulty of believing a contract or its obligation to exist after its full discharge, was felt by
Johnson J. in his opinion.
"Now a grant or conveyance by no .means necessarily implies the continuance
of an obligation beyond the moment of exe(cuting it. It
is most generally but the consununation of a contract,
is functus officio the noment it is executed, and continues afterwards to be nothing more than the evidence
that a certain act was done."
Chief-Justice Marshall states that a contract is
either executory or executed.
"A contract executed
is one in which the object of contract is .performed.."
He then surprises us by saying that "a contract executed, as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding on the parties".
But A and B being
contracting parties, what obligation remains on either,
after he has fully performed?
He bound himself to
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do thus and thus. He has so done. Then surely the
contract is discharged.
It no longer exists.
It is
remembered, the bond or note expressing it may still
be in existence, but the contract and its obligation, were,
not are.
Marshall, C. J., invents a new contract by the very
act of discharging the old.
A grant, he says, is an
execution of the contract, an extinguishlnent of the
grantor's right, and it "inplies a contract not to reassert that right". When A sells a horse to B he makes
the Drse B'Ws, and he is no longer entitled to do to that
horse what he could not do to C's and D's.
He has
created ownership in B destroying his own, and his duty
henceforth is not a contractual one with regard to the
horse..
B has no right in personam against A, but
only the right in rem which is precisely the same as to
A, as it is as to any other human being.
The origination of a contract by implication, not to infringe his
vendee's right, is a mere, and an unnecessary fiction.
The justice seems to assaume that grants are perfornmances of a contract. They often are. They often
are not. A may grant land to B without any contract
to do so. In such a case, the grant ,s not the discharge
of a contractual obligation.
As, says Pollock, in his
Essays on Jurisprudence and Ethics, p. 40, 'When a
sale (a grant) is complete, the seller is bound to respect for an indefinite time the right of ownership acquired by the buyer, * * but we do not say that the
contract of sale is perpetual".
What the Chief-Justice is endeavordng to assert is
the inability of a state to authorize a seller of things
subsequently to impair the ownership of the vendee,
without asserting its inability to authorize in general
any man to impair the ownership of another. The
original federal constitution does not forbid a state's
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impairing, in favor of X, the property rights of Z, but

he is attempting to forbid its impairing in favor of X,
when a vendor, the' property rights of Z, the vendee..
He observes that "it would be strange if a contract to
convey was secured by the constitution, while an absoJute conveyance remained unprotected".
But, is it
not as strange that the property rights of a vendee
should be protected against a vendor, and the property
rights of others not protected at all?
But, let us consider for a moment the obligation
of the contract.
The contract was, with the grant in
pursuance of it, with the four conmilanies.
But, was
the state dbliged by it, if fraud, duress, or mistakes
affected it?
The obligation was conditioned on the
absence of these facts.
There being -fraud, there was
no obligation to recognize the title of the grantee as
sound.
The refusal to recognize its soundness was
therefore no denial of, no imuai ment of an obligation.
Could the act of the grantee impart qualities to the
contract which were not given to it by the grantor?
Are we to say that the state was bound by the judgenm~ade principle that a fraudulent grantee may make
indefeasible his title by a conveyance?
The grantor,
shall we say, contracts with the grantee to respect as
inviolable the title he is conveying, if there is no fraud,
and to respect it as inviolable, even if there is fraud,
provided that the grantee has assigned the subject of
the grant to an innocent buyer?
Ajpparently we must
allow the court to invent such a contract, in order to
subject it to the operation of the principle of the sanctity of the obligation of contracts.
Mving convdnced himself that grants are comprehended in the word contracts, in the constitution, the
Chief-Justice advances to the consideration of the question whether the obligation of grants made by the state
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itself, as well as of grants made by others, is protected.
Bills of attainder are forbidden to the legislatures
of the states, as are ex post factor laws. If the state
cannot seize the property of individuals in this mode,
why should it be jpernitted to do so, in violation of its
contracts?
The unaniknous opinion of the court was declared
that the land sold by Peck to Fletcher, having been
obtained from the four original grantees for a valuable
consideration without notice of the fraud practiced on
the state, Georgia "was restrained either by general
principles which are conlmon to our free institutions,
or by the particular provisions of the constitution of the
United States, from passing a law whereby the estate
of the plaintiff in the prentises so purchased could be
constitutionally and legally impaired and rendered null
and void."
Thus Georgia is stripped of a power, not certainly
by the constitution of the United States, but either by
it or by "principles which are comhnon to our free institutions", a grandiose phrase which means simply
the one principle that an estate in a vendee, defeasible
by the vendor for fraud practiced on hin, becomes indefeasible by the conveyance of it for value, to a bona
fide -purchaser, a principle common not to "our free institutions", but to the courts of equity in the various
states.
Other constitutional authorities are unwilling to
concede the right of the courts to annul statutes, because they supposedly .violate "principles." Cooley
observe, when dealing with this subject, "nor can a
court declare a statute unconstitutional and void when
the objection to it is merely that it is unjust and- oppressive, and violates rights and privileges of the citi-
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zen sunless it can be shown that such injustice is prohibited, or such rights and privileges guaranteed by the
Constitution,"8 nor because the statute "violates one or
more of the fundaknental principles of republican liberty." 9 In 1853, Chief Justice Black declaredio "I am
thoroughly convinced that the words of the constitution
furnish the only test to determine the validity of a
statute, and that all arguments based on general principles outside of the constitution must be addressed to
the people and not to us".
Not so modest was C. J.
Marshall, who, not content with the restrictions upon
state legislation created by the federal constitution, undertakes to make general "principles" invented by the
English and American judges, of equal power to restrain legislation, thus arrogating to himself the authority of the convention of 1787 and of the various
ratifying conventions of 1788 and 1789.11

9Id. p. 168.
'OSharpless vs. Philadelphia; 21 Pa. 147.
" From the American Law iReview for September-October,

1920, -by William Trickett.
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MOOT COURT
F. & M. BANK vs. SEAFORD.
Negotiable Instrument-Consideration-Bona Fide
Agency-Banks and Banking.

Purchaser-

srATMENT OF FACTS.
Seaford executed a note for $1,000 to Jenkins or order. The
consideration was ten horses which were to be delivered within
twenty days.
The note was payable ten days after date.
Jenkins on the fifth day had the note discounted by the plaintiff of
which he was the president.
The Bank was a purchaser for
value bona fide unless the knowledge of the failure of consideration on the part of Jenkins could be imputed to it.
Caldwell for Plaintiff.
Chylak for Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
Beaver, J.-The one important and controlling question in
the case presented is, whether or not the bank could be presumed
to possess the notice of the failure of consideration for the note
in question, and whether or not the knowledge of its president
can be imputed to it.
The general rule of imputation of knowledge of officers is:
A bank is charged with the knowledge acquired by its cashier,
president, or other officers pertaining to transactions within the
scope of the bank's business, altho such knowledge be acquired
in another transaction than to which it relates.
However we
must go farther in the present case, and apply this rule: When
an officer is individually interested in a note or other matter, the
better opinion is that his knowledge is nottobe imputed to his
nank, since his interest is best served by concealing it.
5 Cyc.
460-461.
The rule that knowledge or notice on the -part of the agent
is to be treated as notice to the principal is founded on the duty
of the agent to communicate all material information to his
principal, and the presumption is that he has done so. But legal
presumptions ought to be legal inferences from the natural and
usual conduct of men under the circumstances.
But no agent
who is acting in his own antagonistic interest, or who is about to
commit a fraud by which his principal will be affected, does in
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fact inform the latter, and any conclusion drawn from a presumption that he has done so is contrary to all experience of
human nature, and no agent who is acting in his own antagonistic interest or has committed a fraud by which his principal is
United
affected, can be presumed to have disclosed such fraud.
It is laid down without
Security Co. vs. Bank, 181 Pa. 600.
qualification that an exception to the general rule that notice to
the agent is notice to the principal "arises in case of such conduct
by the agent as raises a clear presumption that he would not
communicate the fact in controversy, as where the agent acts
for himself in his own interest and adversely to that of the princlpal." I Amer. & Eng. Ency. of Law 2nd ed. 1145. The act
of Jenkins is that of an independent fraud committed by an
agent beyond the scope of his employment, and bears analogy
to a tort wilfully committed by a servant for his own purpose,
and not as a means of performing the business entrusted to him
by his master. Gunster vs. Scranton 181 Pa. 338.
Where an officer of a corporation who is also a share-holder
has embezzled the funds of the company, whereby the company
has -a lien upon his stock, the knowledge of the officer of the
fact that some of his shares had been -pledged is not constructive
Sproul vs. Standard
notice of that fact to the corporation.
Glass Co., 201 Pa. 110.
In the recent case of First National Bank vs. Fideliy Trust
Co. 251 Pa. 530 Mestrazat, J., held that where, in an action of
assumpsit on two promisory notes, the defence was, that the
knowledge of the president of the bank as to the intended use of
the funds was imputable to the bank, and would 'be a bar to its
recovery, the knowledge of the president was not imputable to
the bank even though the president of the .bank was a member
of the firm and presented the notes in suit for discount.
The defendants cite Bank vs. Cushman 121 Mass. 490, to sustain the -proposition that notice to an officer of a corporation as to
a matter in his department is notice to the bank. But in that
case, the director acted in conjunction with the cashier of the
bank, and each had knowledge of the fraud. The director did not
act under a veil of secrecy; neither did the cashier; they acted together, and working as they did, in conjunction with each other, I
feel that no injury was sustained in holding that as a finding of
fact, the jury was justified in inferring that the knowledge of the
director and the cashier can be reasonably imputed to the bank
and their knowledge, the knowledge of the bank.
Counsel for the defendant calls to our attention, section 28
of the Act of May 16, 1901, P .L., 194, which is "Absence or fail-
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ure of consideration is a matter of defence as against any person
not a holder in due course, and partial failure of consideration is a
defence pro tanto whether the failure is an ascertained and liquidated amount or otherwise." The view we take of the knowledge
of the failure of consideration by Jenkins, being imputed to the.
bank, renders unnecessary an examination of the question of want
of consideration; the bank was a bona fide purchaser for value; it
was a holder in due course, and the defendants' defence is not
good against the bank as it would be against the original holder,
Jenkins.
After careful consideration, and a thorough examination of
the authorities, we are of the opinion that if Jenkins alone had
acted in discounting the note, and in placing the proceeds to his
own credit, the bank would be bound by his knowledge of the circumstances under which he had dbtained it from the defendants.
Atlantis Cotton Mills vs. Indian Orchard Mills, 147 Mass. 68.
First National Bank of Grafton vs. Charles Babbidge, 160 Mass.
563. But he did not act alone.
The cashier of the bank was the
officer who actually did these things. Jenkins in this transaction
was not the representative of the bank. He was obtaining from
the bank the discount of a note for his own benefit, and thereupon
on the face of the transaction he was on one side of the bargain and
the bank on the other. The cashier was the sole representative
of the bank, at any rate there is no suggestion that he was in collusion with Jenkins, or that he had any reason to doubt that what
he did was for the interest of the bank. If the bank might have repudiated his agency, it did not do so; and even though he may have
gone beyond -his authority, he was a financial officer and agent of
the bank ,and was acting for it and nobody else, and his agency
has not been disavowed and under these circumstances, Jenkin's
knowledge is not to be imputed to the bank, and the bank is therefor entitled to recover on the note.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The defence to the note is the failure of consideration.
But, the plaintiff, the endorsee, is a bona fide purchaser of it
unless the knowledge of its'president is imputable to it.
He caused, for his own -benefit, the bank to discount the note.
It is well settled that what he knew in such a case concerning
the failure of consideration cannot be attributed to the bank. A
bank officer who offers to his -bank a note for discount is to be
regarded in that transaction as a stranger, and the bank is not
chargeable with the officer's knowledge of fraud or want of con-
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sideration for the note.
Dominion Trust Company vs. Hildner;
243 Pa. 253.
To what the learned court below has so well said, it is unnecessary to add anything.
The judgment is
AFFIJMED.
ROPER vc. SYLVAN
Easements-The Right of Lateral Suport to Enjoy the Easement
A Bill in Equity to Compel the Defendant to Supply the
Support.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Sylval by deed granted to Roper who owned land adjoined to
his own, a right of way 10 feet in width in order that Roper
might reach the rear of his lot with wagons.
After Roper had
used the way for five years Sylval began excavating coal from
his tract and continued the process under the way. Although the
surface did not cave -in, Roper justly fearful that the road
would do so if the weight of a loaded wagon came down over it,
filed this bill to compel Sylval to supply support that would
make the way safe to use.
F. W. Davis for plaintiff.
Delestranto for defendant.
Coover, J.-The main question in this case and upon which
the outcome depends is whether the grant of the right of way by
Sylvan by deed was a license or an easement.
Upon the given
facts there is no question in -our mind as to which of the above
two exists.
By the admitted facts of the case Sylval granted the right of
vay to Roper by deed.
Roper was justly fearful that by the act
of the defendant, Sylval, his rights would be cut off or disturbed
to such extent that the grant by Sylval would be of no avail.
The injury threatened is of a character that would prevent a
recovery in damages. By an adequate remedy such recovery would
not give the plaintiff the use of the road for which he is contending. As bearing upon the same subject we cite 183 Pa. 189178 Pa. 543 and 186 Pa. 443. The defense contends that the
grant from Sylval to Roper was a license only. The plaintiff insists that the instrument conveyed to him was an easement.
An easement is a liberty, privilege or an advantage in land
without profit existing distinctly from the ownership of the land
and because it is a premanent interest in the land of another with
the right to enter at all times and enjoy it, it must be founded
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upon a grant by writing or upon a prescription -which presupposes
A license is authority to do a particular act or a series
a grant.
of acts upon land of another without possessing any estate, and in
a license, is founded personal confidnece. It is not assignable and
requires no writing. It is not within the Statue Frauds; it is ordinarily recoverable at will and -determinedby the conveyance of the
land by the party giving the license, while the grant of an easement is within the Statute of Frauds, and it must be in writing,
19 CJH 70.
According to the facts, a deed passed between the parties..
If Sylval had mean to grant a license to Roper why then should a
deed have been granted, accompanied by all the solemnity possible
While there are no
to surround an instrument of this nature?
facts to prove that there was a pecuniary consideration, yet one
should reasonably presume that such was the case, because of the
In other words why should any -person go
passing of the deed.
to the expense and trouble of drawing up a deed, having it
acknowledged and recorded and giving constructive notice to all
the world of the transaction, unless it was prompted by consideration.
An easement, defined, is the right which one person has to
It is
use the right of another for a specific purpose 9 RCL 735.
Because
not a tenancy but a privilege in the lands of another.
lit is an interest in the land of aother -it must be founded upon a
grant in writing or by a prescription, which presupposes a grant.
14 eye 1144.
Gumbert & Huey vs. Watson Kilgore, 4 Sadler 84, it is
In
stated: Where the surface is owned by one person and the coal
underneath by another, the owner of the surface has a right to actual support for his soil, and the owner of the coal has a right to
take out the coal in any way he pleases, so that he supports the
surface in its ancient condition.
Under the powers and rights to him by the easement, Roper
He is the dominant
stands in the light of the owner of the soil
owner and has a right of action against any one who interferes
But it is contended that no actual harm has been
with his right.
done, no one as yet has suffered any material damage but the plaintiff is only justly fearful of something which may happen in the
Is being justly fearful, sufficient grounds for an action
future.
Should it not be taken to a court of law and
of this nature?
there decided as to whether or not a right of action accrues ? In the
majority of cases there must be a prior adjudication at law, but a
court of equity will restrain a threatened interference with the
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exercise of a right without a prior adjudication where the right is
clear and there is no serious dispute as to any of the material
facts. It is not enough for the defendant to deny the plaintiff's
right; his denial must be 'based upon facts which show a substantial dispute.
Piro vs. Shipley, Appellant, 211 Pa. S6.
Has a substantial dispute been shown?
We think not..
The defendant does not deny the plaintiff's right to use the road.
In fact Roper had used it for five years. His rights have never
been interfered with. He has enjoyed, we can safely presume, all
the rights of ownership.
Nothing in the admitted facts show
that he has been restrained from doing anything inconsistent with
an owner's rights.

Finally, if the instrument which passed between Sylvan and
Romper was a license only-we are at a loss to understand why
the -license was not revoked when Roper began this action.
That
a license is revokable at will there is little dispute.. Had the
agreement -been a license only, Sylvan could have revoked it immediately upon hearing that Romper intended bringing this action;
and Roper would have been barred for, he would have no grounds
for a complaint.
Therefore in view of all the surrounding facts we enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
Roper required a right of way over the strip of land 10 feet
in width.
He did not become the owner of any of the constituents of the soil. They continued as before to be the -property of
Sylvan.
But, Sylvan lost the right to do on the 10 feet strip what
could interfere with the use of it as a way by Roper. He could
not build on It, nor excavate it so as to make the passage along it
impossible or difficult.
It Is alleged that he is excavating the coal below the surface,
and that, as a result the adding of the weight of a loaded wagon
to the surface, would probably cause a cave in.
There is no dispute as to the probability of this cave in, nor
of the legitimacy of the apprehension that it would be realized
were the right of passage by Roper to be executed. He is virtually debarred from the use of the way.
This is a result that denies Roper's right, and he is entitled to
a remedy. He is not to be compelled to drive his wagon on the
-insecure road, and take the risk of its breaking thru. While conceivably he would 'be entitled to damages, for the past deprivation
of the use of the way, arising from its unsafe state, this, we think
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is not his only remedy. He has a right to the restoration of the
safety of the road and it is proper to enjoin the defendant to supply the necessary support for the surface so that its utilization by
Roper may be again possible.
Library Co vs. Trust Co., 235
Pa. 5..
The decree of the learned court below must thus be affirmed,
and the appeal.
DISMISSM.
CORRY'S ESTATE.
Will-Probate and Contest-Undue Influence--Delusion-Right of
Testator to Prejudices.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
John Corry had two sons. William married a woman whom
John disliked very much, but without reason. Incensed at this act
he threatened to disinherit William, and a few days after the
marriage, he made a will, giving all his estate except $57 to his
son John. The probate of this will was excepted to by William as
produced by an unreasonable and baseless prejudice, akin to a
delusion.
Crunkleton for the Plaintiff.
Daugherty for the Defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
BLOOM, H J.-The question in this case is, was this will, executed by John Corry, Sr., produced by an unreasonable and
baseless prejudice, akin to a delusion? Vital to the solution of
this question is the determination as to whether or not the
marriage of a son to a woman whom the father dislikes very
much is such an unreasonable and baseless prejudice, akin to a
delusion, which is sufficient to sustain an objection to the probate of a father's will by which a son is disinherited.
We are of the opinion that the marriage of a son to a woman whom a father dislikes very much is not an unreasonable
and baseless prejudice akin to an insane delusion sufficient to
sustain an objection to the probate of the father's will.
We have reached this conclusion through the application of
the facts of the case to several definitions as to what will amount
to a delusion sufficient to overthrow a will. An insane delusion is a belief which has no basis in reason and cannot be dispelled by argument. A mistaken belief as to a matter of fact
or illogical conclusion therefrom is not necessarily an insane
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delusion, neither is any belief or -prejudice however mistaken
which has some basis for it. Even mistaken immaterial prejudice may not be an insane delusion, all persons being subject to
likes and dislikes, and to prove it was an insane delusion it
must appear that there was no basis for it and that attempts
were made by reason to dispel it." 40 Cyc 1014-1015.
This definition says that an insane delusion is "a belief which has no basis
in reason and cannot be dispelled by argument." Now the facts
of the case state that John Corry, Sr., 'disliked' William's wife
very much, but "without reason." The word 'belief' in the definition is a very much stronger and a more meaningful word than
'dislike found in the case. 'Belief'.implies an existence of facts or
reason upon which the opinion is based and we believe when
we are willing to act upon the existence of such facts or reasons. Now a person who would be willing to act upon a set of
facts or reasons, which plainly are the product of a fertile imagination or an abnormally deficient imagination, but which to
a normal and average reasonable man would seem to be an
obsession might be said to be suffering from a delusion. 'Dislike' on the other hand might be the result of an actual state of
facts or an imagined state of facts in the same reasonable man,
so it cannot follow that because a person likes or dislikes, with
or without reason, that the subject is the victim of a delusion,
for who shall judge the sufficiency or insufficiency of the reason if there be one, or the motives for the lack of a reason if
there be no reason upon which to predicate the like or dislike.
Certainly not a judge or jury or possible county receivers. The
only one to judge would be the testator. Alexander's Estate 206
Pa. 58.
Making further introspection of the portion of the definition, "even mistaken unnatural prejudice may not be an insane
delusion, all persons being subject to likes and dislikes, and to
prove it was an insane delusion, it must appear that there was
no basis for it and that attempts were made by reasoning to
dispel it." Herein it is admitted that persons may have -likes
and dislikes without being the victim of an insane delusion.
In
the case at hand the contestant cannot prove that there was no
basis for the prejudice because the testator and not he, was the
judge of the sufficiency of the basis.
To the father the marriage of a son against his will probably was a reason for disinheriting his son and if so he was the sole judge.
The facts do
not site a single instance of an attempt made by William Corry
to dispel the father's dislike by reasoning.
Rather, we do find
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that William exhibits a most hateful contempt for the father's
judgment, because without any effort to dispel the father's prejudice he married the object of his father's dislike.
It is said in Annotated Cases, 1916 C, at page 30,-"An insane delusion is an idea or belief which springs spontaneously
from a diseased or perverted mind without reason or without
foundation in fact.
It is distinguishable from a belief which is
founded upon a prejudice or aversion, no matter how unreasonable
or unfounded the prejudice or aversion may be and if it is the
product of a reasoning mind, no matter how slight the evidence
on which it is founded, it cannot be classed as an insane delusion"
Here we have the spontaneous product of a diseased or
perverted mind, sufficient to be set aside as a will opposed to the
product of a reasoning mind, insufficient to be set aside as a will.
Certanily our case falls within the latter class.
The fact that
the father made the will but two days after the marriage is to us
no evidence of a delusion, because, for anything we know he may
have been acquainted with the woman from the time of her infancy and entertained a dislike for her for a similar period.
That the will in this case is most natural we most affirmatively hold, for it is in entire accord with what the testator from
his known views, feelings and intentions might have been expectted to make under the facts of the case. Morgan's Estate 219,
Pa. 357.
As an illutration most pertinent to the case in hand we cite
the case, "In re Spencer," 31 Pacifiic Reporter 453, wherein a testatrix disinherited her grandson, because as claimed by the grandson of the existence of an insane delusion, caused by a dislike of
the testatrix for her daughter-in-law and the daughter-in-law's
family.
The court held it was not an insane delusion 'but that,
"It was simply such a feeling arising out of the recondite principles of attraction and repulsion as is most common among people of undoubted sanity."
Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that the marriage of a
son to a woman whom a father dislikes very much is not an unreasonable and baseless prejudice akin to a delusion; further,
that the will of John Corry ,Sr., was not the product of a spontaneous belief arising out of a diseased or perverted mind, but that,
it was the result of a deep, inner, dislike of the heart, strengthened in conscience by a reasoning and perfectly functioning mind;
-that the prejudice of John Corry, Sr., was merely a part of his
personal liberty and that therefore the issue must be denied the
petitioner.
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OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
One of the two sons of John Corry had announced his purpose
to his father to marry a certain woman.
This woman was much
disliked, "but without reason," it is said.
Does reason mean
cause?
Hardly, for all emotions lake all other phenomena must have causes. Does "reason" mean such cause as is
not generally believed to properly follow the anticipation of the
marriage, or such effect as should not follow the emotion awakened by the foreknowldge of the marriage.
John "disliked very much" the woman.
William did not dislike her. Perhaps few acquainted with her disliked her.
But
does the non action of Corry's mind ,as do the minds of others, deprive him of the ordinary testamentary power?
Concede that
the dislike was such as few would have felt But, few were about
to have the woman made 'their daughter-in-law despite their
known opposition.
It is quite imaginable that in the dispute. over
so delicate a subject, the son said and did things which tended
not to allay the father's resentment but to exacerbate it.
How
can we say that the emotion is to be penalized by denying to the
testator the usual power of testation?
One has a right to his
own prejudices. Jones' Estate, 235 Pa. 1-Cauffman v. Long, 82
Pa. 72,-Morgan's Estate, 219 Pa. 355,-even the prejudice flowing from a marriage of a daughter with a disliked man. Jones'
Estate, supra.
A man has a right to give all his estate to charities so called,
even at the cost of all his children.
He can give all to one or
some of the children and nothing to the other or others.
Nor
need his act be explained nor need -it be shown in order to execute the testamentary purpose, what the motives were nor make
them seem reasonable to people, judges or jurors, who think that
men are not reasonable in being not quite as they themselves
are.
It is evident that the only facts to show that the will
should not be upheld are the purposed marriage the father's
announced dislike of the marriage with the woman, and of the
woman herself.
Human beings are of very different types.
Some who are much liked by a class, some as strongely disliked
by another class of equally good and competent persons.
And
though the dislike of a woman in a father's mind apart from the
introduction of this woman into his family might be very tepid or
scarcely a dislike at all it might become pronounced against her
and the son if he persisted in the prosecution of his
purpose.
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That the will was provoked by an unreasonable and baseless
prejudice akin to a delusion is not legally evidenced, but is a mere
inference by those who do not like the act of the testator To
dislike the woman cannot be found to be unreasonable, except by
Wllam.
The testator may have had cause enough and, disclosed
to his family, cause enough for his dislike .To affirm the equivalence of the prejudice with a delusion is the result of the lame
That any fact was believed to
psychology of the caveators.
exist by John Corry, which he had no evidential cause of believing, which only a lunatic would have believed, it would be gratuitous for any one to affirm.
We affirm the act of the learned Orphan's Court in admitting
the will to probate.
APPBAL DISMISSED.
BROMWELL vs. COLERIDGE.
Mortgage-Scire Facias Sur Mortgage--Conveyance of Land
Subject to Mortgage---Failure to Record Deed-Failure to
File Affidavit of Ownership--Act April 20, 1905,
P. L. 239--Notice to Terra Tenant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
A, owning land, put a mortgage for $1,000 on it, payable to
B.
Subsequently A conveyed the land to Coleridge who did not
put his deed on record.
B dying, his executor entered scire
facias on the mortgage naming A as mortgagor and not serving
any true tenant although he knew of Coleridge's interest. On the
judgment obtained the land was sold and Bromwell became the
purchaser. This is a petition by him ,as such purchaser to obtain
possession under the Act of April 20th, 1905, P. L. 239.. The defense was that the defendant had not been made a defendant to
the scire facias
Morehead for plaintiff.
Perry for defendant
OPINION OF THE SUPBRIOR COURT.
Mashank, J.-The case at bar presents the question, "Must a
terra tenant be made a party to the action of scire facias, and is
the failure to name him as a party, fatal to the cause of the
plaintiff in the case?"
A terra tenant is one other than the debtor who becomes
seized or possessed of the debtor's lands subject to the lien thereof. The defendant in this case, is the terra tenant.
According to the Act of 1901, as amended by the Act of 1903,
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the plaintiff in any writ of scire facias sur mortgage shall file
with his praecipe and affidavit setting forth to thebest of his knowledge ,information and 'belief, who are the real owners of the land
charged, and all such persons shall be made a party to the writ.
The mortgages -in this case, although knowing of the interest of
the defendant has failed to file this affidavit as directed by the
act.
The act however, does not specify any penalty for the failure to file such affidavit. It does not contain any clause, that
would render any judgment which is given in such action, void..
It prescribes no remedy for the party who is not in fault.
It was
held by this court in the case of Galton vs. Donnon, 44 Superior
280, that no omission to file an affidavit of ownership with a
praecipe for a scire facias sur mortgage as provided by Act of
1903, P. L. 261, does not render a judgment entered in the case,
invalid as against the land.
The effect of the omission is, that
the liens may make any available defense against the purchaser
of the land at the sheriff's sale, that they might have set up on the
trial of the scire facias in case they had been made parties to
that proceeding in manner as prescribed by the act.
Now we arrive at the question, "Would Coleridge have any
defense at the trial of the scire facias?
A person who takes
title to real estate subject to a mortgage cannot, after he has allowed the interest on the mortgage to remain unpaid longer than
the time limit provided by the mortgage, be allowed to complain
that the judgment on the land accompanying the mortgage was
186
entered up and the property sold without notice to himself.
Pa. 589.
Bromwell had no notice of the ownership of Coleridge of the
land
Coleridge did not place his deed on record.
How was
Bromwell to know or have notice that Coleridge was the owner?
A purchaser of land is not affected with notice of anything which
does not lie within the course of his title, or is connected with it.
A purchaser at a sheriff's sale is meant in the
1 Watts 382.
above case. If the purchaser of land does not record his deed, or
takes possession but leaves the vendor in undisturbed possession of the land, so that the plaintiff has no knowledge of the
conveyance, actual or constructive, he does not become a terra
As between himtenant of the land and has no interest therein.
self and his vendor he may have a good title, but as to the lien
creditor he has none.
170 Pa., 611.
A purchaser at a sheriff's
sale on a judgment is protected as against the unrecorded title of
an equitable owner.
144 Pa. 312.
We have discussed the questions presented in tl~e case at bar,
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and now since the Act of 1903 specifies that the failure to file an
affidavit of ownership as directed by the act does not of necessity, in our judgment, abate the action and since the defendans
have no available defense as is permitted by the Act of 1903, in
case of omission to file an affidavit of ownership, we give judgment
in favor of the plaintiff.
OPIIION OF SUPREME COURT.
It is unnecessary to add anything to the clear and satisfactory opinion of the learned court below. Lyle vs. Armstrong, 235
Pa. 227; Gelston vs. Donnon, 44 Pa. Superior Ct. 280
AFFIRMED.
HENRY GILFILLEN vs. JACOB THOMPSON.
Contingent Remainder-Wills--Contingent Remainders May be
Devised-Action of Ejectment for the Recovery of a Farm.
STAT
-MENT
OF FACTS.
John Gilfillen devised his farm to his son William for life, at
his death, to his children in fee, if any children survived 'him; if
not, then to the testator's heirs.
He had two sons, William and
Henry. William devised the farm to Jacob Thompson, a friend,
and died without issue.
In this ejectment Henry seeks to recover the land. Jacob Thompson claims an undivided half of it.
Lehmayer for plaintiff.
Marcus for defendant
Kelchner, J.-We
must ascertain from the face
of
the will itself, what was the intention of the testator. And after
having discovered this it will be our duty in construing the devise
in question, to carry it into effect, so far as it shall be found consistent with the rules and policy of the law to do so.
The testator devised his farm to his son William for life, at
his death to his children in fee, if any children survived him: if
not, then to the testator's heirs. 'He had two sons, William and
Henry. William devised the farm to Jacob Thompson, a friend,
and died without issue. In this ejectment Henry seeks to recover
the land. Jacob Thompson claims an undivided half of it. The
question presented is, what estate did William take under the
will of his father?
The plaintiff rightly contends that the rule in Shelley's Case
does not apply to the above facts. The general rule is that under a devise to A for life, with a remainder to his or her children,
the first taker has no freehold of inheritance.
Primarily and
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generally the word "children", in a will is a word of purchase, and
while it may be used to satisfy "heirs" or "heirs of the body", it
will not be so construed unless the testator has employed other
words indicative of an intention to use it as a word of limitation..
Wilde's 'Case, 6 Coke 277; Ellet v. Paxson, 2 W & S. 436; Haldeman v. Haldeman, 4 Wright 29; -Smith's Estate, 9 Phila. 348;
Guthrie's Appeal, 37 Pa. 12; Hoover v. Strauss, 215 Pa. 130;
Kiem's Appeal, 125 Pa. 487; Chambers v. Union Trust Co, 235
Pa. 610.
Thus we ascertain that the rule in Shelley's Case does not apply to the above state of facts; thereby to vest a fee simple estate
in the son, William.
We look to the will and find that a life estate was given to
William, and at his death the remainder in fee was given to William's children.
The remainder in fee is contingent, upon the
Ibirth of a child or children.
Further it is given at the death of
the life tenant, if any children survive him.
A remainder is contingent if those 'who are to take in remainder are not in existence, or are uncertain, or where the vesting in right as distinguished from taking affect in possession is
dependent upon some uncertain event or contingency..
McCay v.
Clayton, 119 Pa. 136; Keller v. Lee's, 176 Pa 402; Manderson v..
Lukens, 23 Pa. 31; Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Wood, 201 Pa.
427; Neel's Estate, 252 Pa. 405..
The testator further provides, if any children survive the life
tenant; if not, then to the testator's heirs..
This is not a fee
l1mited on a fee for, that would not be sustained
The devise
is called a fee with a double aspect..
The fee passes to the child
or children at the death of the life tenant if none survive him,
then it passes to the testator's heirs
Both are contingent remainders, and neither vest until the contingency happens which
determines where the fee shall go.
That contingency is determined at the determination of the life estate. Goodright v. Dunham, 1 Dougl. 265; Crump v. Norwood, 7 Taunt 362; Davy v.
Burnsall, 6 Term Rep. 30..
The early common law of England recognized two well
First, that a particusettled rules with reference to remainders.
lar estate of freehold was necessary to support a freehold contingent remaindr. Fearne on Contingent Remainder, 281; 2 Bl. Com165, and secondly, that a contingent remainder must vest during
the continuance of the particular estate or eo istante that -it determined, otherwise it would fail and could never vest. 2 BI
Corn. 168.
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The final question presented by the above stated facts, is
whether a contingent remainder is devisable?
At common law it was formrly held that a contingent remainder was not such an interest as could be devised bh the remainder man.
This opinion seems to have arisen from too narrow a construction of the word "having" in the statute of wills.
But later decisions have held the contrary and it is now wel
settled that such interest may be devised.
Roe v.Jones, 1 H. BI
30; 3 Term Rep. 88; Ingilby v. Amcots, 21 Beav. 585; Stewart v.
Neely. In Jackson v. Waldron, 13 Wendell 178; it was -held that
a mere naked possibility without being coupled with an anterest, as
that where there is a devise of a farm to A, and of a second farm
to B, and if either die without issue, his estate go to the
survivor, and both be living, such a possibility cannot be assigned
or released, or devised ,or pass by descent, and can only be extinguished by estoppel.
On the other hand, if the possibility be
coupled with an interest, as when the person who is to take upon
the happening of the contingency, is ascertained, and fixed, such
a possibility may be released, devised, or assigned like any other
future estate, in remainder. Further, all contingent and executory interests are assignable in equity, and will be enforced if
made for a valuable consideration.
Wright v. Wright, 1
Vesey 411.
The devise to the children of William in fee, being made on a
contingency which never happened, the fee consequently was in
the testator's heirs, (Villiam and Henry)..
They are tenants in
common in the farm and each has an undivided half interest
therein.
Stewart v. Neely, 139 Pa. 309, Held: A contingent remainder can be conveyed ,bydevise, a deed purporting to convey
it operates only as an estoppel, unless the conveyance is made after
the contingency happens. Thus we conclude that William devised
his half interest in the fee to the defendant, who can recover, and
judgment is rendered for the defendant
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
We Approve the decision of the learned court below, in this
case, and are thoroughly satisfied with the signal industry and
learning which are manifested by the opinion.
We shall state
briefly, the view which we take of the problem.
(a) The devise was to William for life.
This gave a lifeestate ,unless what follows enlarges the gift.
(b) At William's death, the gift is to his children in fee, if
any children survive hirm
This does not increase the estate of
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Children is not a word of limitation equivalent to
William..
The gift to the children is a reheirs or issue ,without more.
mander in fee to them.
(c) But it is a contingent remainder. It is contingent until
It would have continued
there are children (the actual case).
to be contingent, even after their birth for the takers of this remainder are to be children who survive William. Throughout his
At his death
entire life, then the .remainder was contingent.
there bing no children this remainder lapsed and disappeared
(d) But, the will then provides, if any children do not survive William, then the remainder shall pass to the testator's
Those Wvho were such at the time of the
heirs.
What heirs?
testator's death, or those who should be such at the death of William? Nothing in the will indicates that the testator meant the
latter, and in the absence of such indication, it must be assumed
McFillin's Estate, 235 Pa. 1'75..
that the former was intended..
Under the will then, the two -sons being the heirs, took the remainder as tenants in common.
(e) But, were this not so, the testator would have died intestate, as to the remainder, in the circumsances that actually developed, and the sons would have taken under the intestate law.
A contingent re(f)William devised the farm to Thompson.
mainder may be devised, Stewart v Neely, 139 .Pa. 309; Tiffany
As an undivided half thus passed to
Real Property, p. 307.
Thompson ,only the other undivided half can be recovered from
But Henry can recover so much.
him by Henry.
JtDGMENT AFFIRMED.

